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1959] RECENT CASES
terpretation of this rule necessarily considers benefits and hardships. 4  Only
by the production and sale, basic consideration for execution of the lease,
does the lessor realize value. 5  It appears that the better rule is for lease
termination when there are no reasonable grounds for ceasing production,5
and this was followed in Oklahoma recently.7
It may be inferred from a decision that North Dakota courts would render
the same judgment as given in the principal case.8  Such a holding would
be repugnant to the view of lease termination under common law or special
limitation upon which interest terminates immediately, 9 and also derogatory
to statutory interpretation, 10 unless delay rental is provided for under the
terms of the lease."
The instant case is subject to criticism because no logical reason appears
why the shut-down period could not extend to a year or longer, if lessee sug-
gests it is "temporary." Suggested for consideration, was the possibility of
continued production with impoundment of the runs, thereby protecting in-
terests of lessors as well as disputing lessees.12
LAWRENCE M. NACATOMO.
MINES AND MINERALS - NATURE OF ESTATE GRANTED OR RESERVED -
RESERVATION CLAUSE HELD TO RESERVE MINERALS IN PLACE. - Plaintiff
brought an action to determine his rights under the following mineral reser-
vations in a deed of land not under any oil and gas lease: "We do hereby
lessee, in closing down th,! wells had done so with the intention of abandoning the
same." Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940). Also compare with
Texas rule, which is much more favorable for the lessor than the Louisiana rule, be-
cause it has been modified to, allow a temporary cessation of production due to sudden
stoppage of the well or some mechanical breakdown of the equipment used in connection
therewith, or the like." Watson v Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783 (1911). Cf.
Waggoner v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929). (In place of forfeit-
ure it was suggested a lease is a determinable fee which is lost on cessation of produc-
tion). See also, 2 SUMMERS, OIL & GAS § 305 n. 19.
4. See, e.g., Lamb v. Vansyckle, 205 Ky. 597, 266 S.W. 253 (1924) (No termination
where royalties were paid during period of 56 days cessation); Zeller v. Book, 7 Ohio
Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 429, 28 Ohio C.C. 119 (1905) (Where cessation was due to derricks
being blown down in storm).
5. In the instant case the dissenting opinion stated that the holding amounted to
amending the lease by the court. "Its effect is to change the 'as long thereafter' clause
to read 'It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a term of one year from
date, and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, can be produced from said
land by the lessee, as distinguished from 'is produced.' "
6. Anthis v. Sullivan Oil & Gas Co., 83 Okla. 86, 203 Pac. 187 (1921); Western
States Oil and Land Co. v. Helms, 140 Okla. 206, 288 Pac. 964 (1930); Woodruff v.
Brady, 181 Okla. 105, 72 P.2d 709 (1937). For a further discussion, see 2 SUMMERsS,
OsL & GAS § 305 n. 19.
7. Brown v. Shafer, 325 P.2d 743 (Okla. 1958).
8. Herman Hanson Oil Syndicate v. Bentz, 77 N.D. 20, 40 N.W.2d 304 (1949)
(court will not declare an oil and gas lease terminated by lessee unless it appears by
direct evidence or prepondeient circumstances that lessee intended to abandon the lease,
and there must be a demand by lessor upon lessee to comply with implied covenants
and allowances of a reasonable time for compliances).
9. Woodside v. Lee, 81 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1957) (Under an "unless" oil and gas
lease, failure of lessee to commence drilling operations within stated time terminates lease
without any notice or demand upon part of lessor, unless delay rentals are paid).
10. N.D. Rev. Code § 47-1616 (1943).
11. N. D. Rev. Code § 38-1003 (1957 Supp.) (Provides for payment of royalties and
delay rentals. A lease may provide for delay rentals which will operate as a rental to
cover privilege of deferring commencement of a well for a period or successive periods as
provided in a lease).
12. The dissenting opinion in 'the instant case stated that there appears no reason under
the record which would have prevented continuing production and impounding the runs
during the dispute between the lessees.
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reserve for ourselves, our heirs and assigns, one-eighth of all the oil and gas
which may be produced from said lands to be delivered in tanks and pipe-
lines in the customary manner, and this shall be a covenant running with the
land and all sales and other conveyances of said lands shall be subject to
this reservation and agreement." The Supreme Court of Mississippi held,
three justices dissenting, that the words of the deed reserved to the grantors
an interest in the oil and gas in place and not a nonparticipating royalty
interest. Mounger v. Pittman, 108 So.2d 565 (Miss. 1959).
Generally, where the reservation of a royalty is made before the execution
of an oil and gas lease, and is not limited as to time, the interest is referred
to as a perpetual nonparticipating royalty.' The following are usual character-
istics of this interest and distinguish it from the ownership of the oil and gas
in place: (1) free of cost of discovery and production,2 (2) no right of
ingress and egress,- (3) no right to grant leases 4 and (4) no right to receive
bonuses and delay rentals.5 The oil and gas in place, or mineral fee interest,
usually possesses the following characteristics: (1) not free of costs of dis-
covery and production,c (2) with right of exploration and discovery,7 and (3)
with right to grant leases, to receive bonuses and delay rentals. 8
Where the instrument of conveyance uses the words: oil and gas, "in and
under,"9 "in and under and that may be produced from,"1o the land, the
courts ordinarily hold that a mineral fee interest is created. However, if the
following words are used, "produced,"11 "produced and saved,"l2 "produced,
saved, and made available for market,"'1 the interest usually created is a
royalty. The fraction one-eighth has significance since this is the usual royalty
reserved.
1 4
Precisely what interests are created by given language is a matter of ascer-
1. Clampitt v. Ponder, 91 F. Supp. 535 (W.D. Ark. 1950); Calcote v. Texas Pacific
Coal and Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946); Hanson v. Ware, 224 Ark. 430, 274
S.W.2d 359 (1955); Stakes v. Tutvet, 328 P.2d 1096 (Mont. 1958); See 3A SuM-
MERS, OIL & GAS, §§ 572-599 (2d. ed. 1958).
2. Surety Royalty Co., v. Sullivan, 275 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1954); See Maxwell, The
Mineral-Royalty Distinction and the Expense of Production, 33 Texas L. Rev. 463 (1955).
3. La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18 Cal.2d 132, 114 P.2d 351 (1941); Pease v.
Dolezal, 206 Okla. 696, 246 P.2d 757 (1952).
4. Calcote v. Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946); Shlit-
tier v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937).
5. Colonial Royalties Co. v. Keener, 266 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1953); See 3A SUMMERS,
OIL AND GAS, § 599 (2nd ed. 1958).
6. See Surety Royalty Co. v. Sullivan, 275 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1954); See Maxwell,
The Mineral-Royalty Distinction and the Expense of Production, 33 Texas L. Rev. 463
(1955).
7. Miller v. Ridgley, 2 1ll.2d 223, 117 N.E.2d 759 (1954); See Douglas v. Douglas,
175 Okla. 378, 56 P.2d 362 (1936).
8. Pease v. Dolezal, 206 Okla. 696, 246 P.2d 757 (1952).
9. Robinson v. Southwestern Development Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d 1, 277 P.2d 825
(1954); Miller v. Speed, 248 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); See Armstrong v.
McCraken, 204 Okla. 319, 229 P.2d 590 (1951).
10. Little v. Mountain View Dairies, 35 Cal.2d 232, 217 P.2d 416 (1950); See Wat-
kins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179, 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945).
11. See Hardy v. Greathouse, 406 Ill. 365, 94 N.E.2d 134 (1950); See Elliot v.
Berry, 206 Okla. 594, 245 P.2d 726 (195Z); See Armstrong v. McCracken, 204 Okla.
319, 229 P.2d 590 (1951).
12. Hanson v. Ware, 224 Ark. 430, 274 S.W.2d 359 (1955); Mitchell v. Hannah,
123 Mont. 152, 208 P.2d 812 (1949).
13. Miller v. Speed, 248 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
14. Shin v. Buxton, 154 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1946); Duvall v. Stone, 54 N.M. 27,
213 P.2d 212 (1949); State Nat'l Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509, 143
S.W.2d 757 (1940) (Where the court took judicial notice that one-eighth is the usual
royalty reserved); Cheek v. Metzer, 116 Tex. 356, 291 S.W. 860 (1927).
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taining the intent of the parties, arrived at from a consideration of the con-
veying instrument's terms and attending circumstances.' 5  However, when,
as in the instant case, the parties use clear language such as: "... one-eighth
of all the oil and gas which may be produced ... ," it is submitted that such
language should be held to result in the creation of a royalty interest. To
hold otherwise is to ignore the usual operative effect given such language by
the courts.
DAVID C. JOHNSON.
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS - RAILROADS-RIGHT OF WAY ASSESSMENT LIABILITY
DEPENDS ON PRESENT oR FUrURE BENEFITS. - Planitiff railrqad's main, line
right of way ran adjacent and parallel to two portions of defendant's city
street that was repaved. Plaintiff was assessed more than 50% of the total
amount in the special assessment repaving district. The Michigan Supreme
Court held, five justices dissenting, that the railroad failed to show that no
benefits inured to the right of way at the present time or in the foreseeable
future and was therefore liable for the paving assessment. New York R.R. v.
Detroit, 93 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. 1959).
Most courts hold that property of a railroad may be made liable by assess-
ment for local improvements.' The peculiar character of a railroad right of
way gives rise to special problems in applying special assessments against it.
2
There is conflict of authority as to whether a special assessment may be en-
forced against a railroad right of way. 3
Many courts hold that a railroad right of way is liable for assessment for
local improvements only if it can be said to be benefited by the improve-
ments. 4 This does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.' But if the cost
of paving is without any compensating advantage and if the statute requires
as a basis for its operation the existence of benefits, then the assessment
amounts to confiscation.6 An assessment by proper authority being prima facie
valid, the burden is on the railroad to show that it is not benefited.7 There is
a split of authority as to whether the court may say as a matter of law that a
right of way does not receive a benefit.' Some states hold that a special
assessment should be upon the basis of benefits to the property assessed from
the improvements and not upon the number of square feet in the property, or
15. Dabney-Johnson Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal.2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935); Hickey
v. Dirks, 156 Kan. 326, 133 P.2d 107 (1943); Pure Oil Co. v. Kindall, 116 Ohio St.
188, 156 N.E. 119 (1927).
1. E.g., Carolina & N.W. BR. v. Clover, 46 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1931) (Benefit not
necessary); Cowart v. Union Paving Co., 216 Cal. 375, 14 P.2d 764 (1932).
2. Cf. Northern Pac. R.R. v. Seattle, 46 Wash. 674, 91. Pac. 244 (1907).
3. See, Town of Clayton v. Colorado & S. By., 51 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1931) (Solely
a question of state policy).
4. See Northern Pac. R.R. v. Grand Forks, 73 N.W.2d 348, (N.D. 1955); Thomas
v. Kansas City Southern By., 261 U.S. 481 (1923).
5. Northern Pac. R.R. v. Richland County, 28 N.D. 172, 148 N.W. 545 (1914);
Louisville & N. By. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430 (1905).
6. See Georgia R. & Electric Co. v. City of Decatur, 295 U.S. 165 (1934).
7. Chicago, R. I. & P. By. v. Wright County Drainage Dist., 175 Iowa 417, 154
N.W. 888 (1916).
8. See, e.g., Long Island By. v. Hylan, 940 N.Y. 199, 148 N.E. 189 (1925) (no
benefit declared as a matter of law); Contra, Grand Rapids v. Grand Trunk By. System,
214 Mich. 1, 182 N.W. 424 (1921) (Matter for the jury).
